Stemming the Virus: Understanding and Responding to the Threat of Russian Disinformation

Marcus Kolga's February 2019 policy paper is historically significant as the foundational Canadian policy document on Russian disinformation operations — the first major paper to map Russian information warfare methodology, key narrative vectors, proxy platforms, and institutional vulnerabilities in a Canadian policy context. Published before the Hogue Commission and the COVID-19 infodemic dramatically accelerated government attention to these issues, the paper proposed a Canadian National Centre for Strategic Communications and Digital Democracy that anticipated the institutional architecture debate that would follow.

The paper's analytical quality was recognised beyond Canada: it was praised by Five Eyes analysts, European Values / Kremlin Watch, and cited extensively in subsequent parliamentary and academic work. Read retrospectively, Stemming the Virus is notable for the accuracy of its threat assessment — the Russian disinformation vectors and vulnerabilities it identified in 2019 are, with some technical updates, still the relevant framework. For researchers tracing the development of Canadian counter-FIMI policy and for practitioners who want to understand how the field looked before the acceleration of 2019–2022, this is an essential historical document.